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Circle of Fire: The Indian War of 1865. By John
D. McDermott. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 2003. xvi + 287 pp. Illustrations, maps,
notes, bibliography, index. $26.95.
The Indian War of 1865 marks the last time
Plains Indians actually took the offensive
against white intrusions into their territory.
Besides the basic disruption of their hunting
grounds by thousands of outsiders en route to
the gold fields of Montana, the immediate
cause was the massacre of Black Kettle's band
of Cheyennes at Sand Creek by Colorado Territorial Volunteers in 1864. Throughout Circle
of Fire, John D. McDermott refers to the hostile tribes as "the avengers," and rightfully so.
Although in subsequent campaigns the Indians were largely on the defensive, the war of
1865 set the tone for the twenty-five years of
bloodshed that culminated at Wounded Knee
in 1890.
McDermott does an excellent job of chronicling this little-known and little-understood
war as a whole. The book's real value, however, lies in his conclusions. He points out
that the war was fought primarily by Volunteer troops who expected to be discharged at
the end of the Civil War. Instead, they found
themselves thrust into an Indian campaign,
their disillusionment augmented by a new
militancy among the Indians. But McDermott
also notes that despite several mutinies, the
Volunteers, when called on to fight and endure, acquitted themselves admirably.
If the campaign failed, it was largely because of the proverbial "system." McDermott
points to a breakdown of plans and inadequacies of a military organization not suited for
the Plains. As an institution, the army learned
nothing from this or any other Indian campaign.
McDermott offers new insights into the often deprecated career of Brigadier General
Patrick Connor. He notes that Connor understood Indian fighting as well as any officer of his time and, left to his own devices,
might have succeeded in breaking the Indian
resistance. This, in turn, might have avoided
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ensuing decades of bloodshed. But this was
not to be.
CHARLES

M.

ROBINSON

III

Department of History and Philosophy
South Texas College

